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Transparency of Mind: The Contributions of Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Berkeley to the Genesis of the Modern Subject
Gary Hat! eld
Philosophers often use classical positions as paradigms for de! ning their own views, 
usually in contrast. In the philosophy of mind, the notion of the Cartesian subject is 
one such paradigm. This notion is often used to represent tendencies in the conception 
of the subject that today’s philosophers wish to avoid. John McDowell and Hilary 
Putnam1, among others, portray the Cartesian subject – and speci! cally the Cartesian 
mind – as a step backward from an earlier, preferable Aristotelianism, whose concept of 
mind might be made serviceable today if adjusted to ! t modern science.
Such paradigms, whose use is unavoidable, are typically caricatures, whether slight 
or gross. The Cartesian mind as standardly portrayed by McDowell, Putnam, and oth-
ers2 is a gross caricature. This would be important enough for its potential to mislead 
us about the actual historical development of philosophy. But even more crucially for 
the philosophy of mind, the use of a caricatured picture as a counterparadigm against 
which one de! nes one’s own, comparatively better position, can lead to a pyrrhic vic-
tory that avoids or misrepresents the real problems. If the opponent has been tailored 
to one’s desired virtues as conquering hero, one may give the impression that one’s own 
position solves great problems, deeply embedded in the tradition, when in fact one has 
simply rejected a fairly recent problematic position, which one has perhaps also misun-
derstood and misidenti! ed.3 
The Cartesian mental paradigm is frequently de! ned in terms of four factors: con-
sciousness as essence, intentionality as exclusively mental, the veil of perception, and 
the transparency of mind. More fully:
(S1)  The Cartesian mind collects “the mental” into an immaterial substance, divo-
rced from nature, whose essence is consciousness;
(S2)  In the mind-body divide, intentionality is removed from material nature and 
becomes the sole preserve of mind; 
(S3)  The mind is cut off from direct epistemic contact with the material world by a 
veil of perception (epistemic indirect realism); 
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(S4)  The mind is fully transparent: if it has a thought or sensation or other mental 
state, it knows it.
Theorists typically hold that S1 and S2 are basic; that S3 is the result of the loss of 
“natural intentionality” in S2; while S4 follows from the fact that the essence of mind 
is consciousness. Theorists may also contrast these four points with Aristotelian hy-
lomorphism, according to which (1) mental processes need not all be conscious; (2) 
intentionality is found in natural states (such as “sensible species”); (3) knowledge is 
direct, through similitudes in which “like knows like”; and (4) only some mental states 
are available to re" ection.4
In calling this Cartesian paradigm a gross caricature, I have signaled that it does not 
describe the position of Descartes himself, for whom it is named. In fact, I hold that 
of points S1 to S4, only S2 fully ! ts Descartes. Part of S1 ! ts, the positing of a mental 
substance, but the essence of that substance arguably is not consciousness but thought, 
which has two aspects, perception and will, with perception, or the ability to represent, 
as the fundamental (essential) aspect.5 Regarding S3, indirect realism with respect to 
thought is not Cartesian, for he held that the mind has direct intellectual insight into 
the essence of matter (which is extension); indirect realism with respect to the senses is 
more controversial: a case can be made on both sides, and I favor reading Descartes as 
a direct realist.6
My main focus here is S4, the transparency of thought. Many recent philosophers 
assume that Descartes believed the mind to be “transparent”7: since all mental states 
are conscious, we are therefore aware of them all, and indeed incorrigibly know them 
all. Transparency includes both features:
(T1)  We are aware of all our thoughts or other mental states;
(T2)  We have incorrigible knowledge of our mental states.
It is easy to see how Descartes’ uni! cation of the mental in an immaterial substance 
whose occurrent states are all conscious states could lead one to believe that he af! rmed 
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the transparency thesis, and how his cogito premise might be paired with an incorrigi-
biltiy thesis. More generally, it may seem as if the transparency of the Cartesian subject 
set the terms for the “modern subject” at least through the time of Kant with his unity 
of apperception, and that it was overturned only during the nineteenth century with its 
(allegedly original) theoretical introduction of unconscious thought processes.
And yet, the genesis of the modern subject is not so simple. Or rather, the early mod-
ern concept of the subject isn’t so simple. Focusing speci! cally on transparency, I want 
to explore T1 and T2 most fully in Descartes, but also in Berkeley and Leibniz. In the 
remainder of this section, I lay out my claims about the transparency thesis as applied 
to these three philosophers (leaving textual evidence to the following section). 
Descartes and Berkeley do indeed make statements that seem to endorse one or both 
of the transparency theses. However, they also make systematic theoretical statements 
that directly countenance “unnoticed” thoughts or mental states, that is, thoughts or 
mental states of which the subject is unaware and does not “perceive”. Descartes, hav-
ing identi! ed the essence of mind with thought or representation, distinguishes bare 
states of mind from states of which we have re" ective awareness, thereby providing a 
theoretical tool for understanding both his seeming endorsement of transparency and 
his actual denial of it: Descartes distinguished between a basic perceptual state, or a 
basic awareness, and re" ectively conscious states that involve explicit noticing and cog-
nizing on the part of the subject. Leibniz directly endorsed a similar distinction between 
bare perception and re" ective consciousness, using the term “perception” for the ! rst 
and “apperception” for the second. In these cases, bare perceptions are not transpar-
ently available to the subject, and so in fact the subject does not have knowledge, hence 
does not have incorrigible knowledge, of all its occurrent mental states.
More generally, early modern philosophers endorsed an elaborate psychology of the 
subject, which gave important roles to re" ex and habit and to the passions in the gen-
esis of human behavior. In the case of re" ex, habit, and adaptive responses to passion-
invoking situations, these responses are mediated by the body, not the mind. The re-
sponses are produced by bodily mechanisms alone. Descartes thought that many human 
behaviors, and Leibniz (as well as Spinoza) thought that all human behavior, even that 
deriving from reason, could be given a mechanical explanation.8 Berkeley, of course, 
afforded mechanical explanation a more limited scope.
Berkeley also differed from Descartes and Leibniz on the intentionality of sense per-
ception. Arguably Descartes, and certainly Leibniz, held that sensory mental states are 
intrinsically intentional: they are intrinsically “as of” the world. This does not con" ict 
with what is right in S2 from above, that Descartes excluded intentionality from mate-
rial nature. But, contrary to the position that Putnam9 (for example) foists upon him, 
Descartes did not treat sensations as mere “subjective effects”, as mere causal products 
of an external world that must itself be inferred from behind a veil of perception. Gen-
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erally, he treated sensations as a species of perception, and attributed them “objective” 
(or “representative”) “reality”10, which renders them as (ostensible) presentations of 
objects. Berkeley, by contrast, did deny intentionality to sensory ideas, but without 
introducing a veil that cuts us off from material things: in his immaterialist world, 
sensory ideas become associated with other sensory ideas, but because there is no ma-
terial world, the ideas are merely associative signs of one another. (These Berkeleyan 
ideas are, of course, veils with respect to their true cause, God as in! nite immaterial 
substance.)
Leibniz, like Descartes, treated the two fundamental aspects of mental substance 
as perception and will, or, in his terms, perception and appetite. Unlike Descartes, he 
rendered everything as, in the ! rst instance, soul-like. The states of his famous monads 
are constituted from sequences of perceptions and appetites, the former following from 
one another in accordance with the latter. Perceptions are fundamentally of a world: 
they represent the multiplicity of the world, each from a point of view that resides in a 
simple substance.
In the subsequent sections, I ! rst interpret some passages that support the claims I’ve 
made; I then elaborate the complex psychology of the subject found in Descartes and 
other early moderns; and I note some ways in which these early moderns contributed to 
the genesis of the modern subject. Finally, I compare McDowell’s positions with those 
of Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz on each issue addressed in S1 to S4. I claim that, 
leaving aside substance dualism, McDowell agrees with the early moderns on these 
issues, and, further, that by focusing on disagreements that are not real, he misses the 
actual basis of his dif! culty in connecting mind with world, which arises from a point 
of agreement between McDowell and Descartes: the removal of intentionality from 
material sensory systems. But whereas Descartes could relocate sensory intentionality 
in mental states, McDowell is left to account for it with his overly cognitivized “second 
nature” conceptual schemes.11
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Bare Perception vs. Re" ective Consciousness
First, let’s review some passages in which Descartes seems to endorse T1. Here are two 
from the Meditations:
“Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that 
we are immediately conscious of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, 
the imagination and the senses are thoughts.”12
“there can be nothing in the mind, insofar as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not 
conscious. […] we cannot have any thought of which we are not conscious at the 
very moment when it is in us.”13
The context to the second passage even suggests that, if we concentrate on such thoughts, 
we would have indubitable knowledge of them, as in T2.
But in other passages, Descartes indicates that there are states of mind, including oc-
current states, that we do not notice or of which we are unaware. From the Discourse:
“many people do not know what they believe, since believing something and know-
ing that one believes it are different acts of thinking, and the one often occurs with-
out the other.”14
In this passage, Descartes distinguishes the act of believing, which I take here to be oc-
current, from knowledge of that act. However, in the Passions he explains that some 
acts of mind, and in particular willings, are such that “we cannot will anything without 
thereby perceiving that we are willing it”.15
In a famous passage from the Sixth Replies (in the Meditations), Descartes invokes 
unnoticed operations of judgment. When we perceive the size of something from its 
visual angle and perceived distance, we do this through an act of judgment; but we do 
not notice that we are making the judgment, so we treat the resulting state as a simple 
sense perception:
“we make the calculation and judgment at great speed because of habit, or rather we 
remember the judgments we have long made about similar objects; and so we do not 
distinguish these operations from simple sense-perception.”16
The operation of these habits of judgment is not transparent to us.
Finally, in discussing infants, Descartes remarks that they may have thoughts, but 
that the subject will not know about these thoughts because it does not remember them. 
In making these points, he distinguishes bare thoughts and perceptions from re" ective 
knowledge of them:
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“I do not doubt that the mind begins to think as soon as it is implanted in the body 
of an infant, and that it is immediately aware of its thoughts, even though it does not 
remember this afterwards because the impressions of these thoughts do not remain 
in the memory.”17
One will not be aware of having had a thought if one cannot remember that one had it. 
This claim might not be surprising if a considerable temporal gap separates the thought 
and the lack of memory. But Descartes draws a more general distinction between bare 
consciousness, or basic awareness, and a higher order consciousness in which the sub-
ject is not merely aware of some content, but is aware that it has the thought at the time 
it has it. In a letter for Arnauld (29 July 1648), Descartes explicitly distinguishes bare 
consciousness from re" ection.
“I call the ! rst and simple thoughts of infants direct and not re" ective – for instance 
the pain they feel when some wind distends their intestines, or the pleasure they feel 
when nourished by sweet blood. But when an adult feels something, and simultane-
ously perceives that he has not felt it before, I call this second perception re" ection, 
and attribute it to the intellect alone, in spite of its being so linked to sensation that 
the two occur together and appear to be indistinguishable from each other.”18
Adults are, at least some of the time, re" ectively aware that they are having a particular 
kind of sensation. In the same letter, Descartes also allows that there are some acts of 
mind, such as directing the animal spirits to the nerves, of which we have no awareness 
at all.19
Not only are we not re" ectively aware of all our thoughts, but we may be mistaken 
about the character of some thoughts of which we are aware. Thus, in Meditation III, 
Descartes speaks of habitual beliefs which he mistakenly took to be clear and distinct 
perceptions, when they were not:
“I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident many things which I afterwards 
realized were doubtful. […] there was something else which I used to assert, which 
through habitual belief I thought I perceived clearly, although I did not in fact do 
so.”20
Accordingly, we may be mistaken about the character (the clarity and distinctness, in 
this instance) of some of the thoughts of which we are aware.
A similar distinction can be found in Berkeley, between ideas in the mind and the 
notice we take of them. Let us consider some passages from the New Theory of Vision. 
In the ! rst passage, he is discussing a topic from optics: lines of sight and their con-
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vergence for near or far vision. He assumes that if something is in the mind, he would 
perceive it:
“But those lines and angles, by means whereof some men pretend to explain the 
perception of distance, are themselves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever 
thought of by those unskilful in optics. […] Everyone is himself the best judge of 
what he perceives, and what not. In vain shall any man tell me, that I perceive certain 
lines and angles, which introduce into my mind the various ideas of distance, so long 
as I myself am conscious of no such thing.”21
From this passage, it may seem that Berkeley ascribes to T1. But we must consider two 
other passages from the New Theory, in which he speaks of thoughts or ideas that be-
come so closely associated that, even though both of them enter the mind, we perceive 
only one of them, and are unaware that it has replaced another idea:
“No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears, but 
the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very same in-
stant that sound and the meaning enter the understanding: so closely are they united 
that it is not in out power to keep out the one, except we exclude the other also. We 
even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves.”22
“So swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the transit from visible to tangible ideas 
that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate object of vision.”23
In the second passage, he calls the transition that occurs between visible and tangible 
ideas – which is a transition of state of mind – something so “swift” that it is “unpercei-
ved”. Here, a change of state occurs in our mind, but we do not perceive it, hence are 
unaware of it, hence a fortiori do not have incorrigible knowledge of it.
Finally, Leibniz explicitly drew the distinction that is found in Descartes’ correspon-
dence, between bare perception and re" ective awareness, terming the latter “appercep-
tion”. Discussing his celebrated monads, or individual substances, he says:
“it is well to make a distinction between perception, which is the inner state of the 
monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the 
re" ective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given to all souls or to 
any soul all the time. It is for lack of this distinction that the Cartesians have made 
the mistake of disregarding perceptions which are not themselves perceived, just as 
people commonly disregard imperceptible bodies.”24
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In this case, apperception involves awareness of our thoughts, whereas perception is 
simply a soul-like state that represents something else. Basic perceptions that are not 
themselves apperceived are, in Descartes’ terms, “conscious”. In this passage, Leibniz 
restricts that term to apperceptive or re" ective perception. But his perceptions are soul-
like states that have the phenomenal character of experienced perceptions and which 
he sometimes compares to a dull awareness.25 Hence we may conclude that, terminol-
ogy aside, Leibniz would be amenable to a distinction between basic consciousness and 
re" ective consciousness, as was Descartes.
The Psychology of the Modern Subject
Those who invoke the notion of the Cartesian subject typically suppose that Descartes 
drew a clean, bright line between the mental and the psychological, on the one hand, 
and the material and mechanistic, on the other. They suppose that he brought psychol-
ogy into the conscious mind, subject again to the transparency thesis. If that were so, 
the philosophical and psychological admonition to “know thyself” should be easy to 
achieve. Not only one’s thoughts, but all psychological processes that guide behavior 
should be open to an incorrigible view. It would be more dif! cult to discover latent 
beliefs and mental capacities, but to the extent that one could formulate a question 
about these beliefs or capacities, one should be able to discover their presence.26 One 
would suppose that, again, the same should hold for behavior-guiding psychological 
capacities.
We have already seen that Descartes did not hold that we are re" ectively aware of 
all our mental acts, or even that we could become re" ectively aware of all of them. 
Perhaps even more surprisingly, Descartes and other early moderns did not simply ship 
all of psychology into the mind – into, in Descartes’ case, an immaterial substance that 
constitutes a ghost in the machine of the human body. Rather, Descartes and others 
assigned signi! cant psychological roles, even in the human case, to bodily mechanisms 
that respond adaptively to current situations in such a way as to preserve the health of 
the body. This ranges from (what we would term) simple re" exes, such as the eye-blink 
when a hand is thrust in our face27, to protecting one’s head when one stumbles, and 
to activities such as walking and singing28, and other activities governed by instinct or 
habit.29 These behaviors are produced physiologically, through mechanisms in the brain 
to which we have no introspective access and which can operate independently of the 
mind.
Autorenfreistück – Nicht im Handel ... Autorenfreistück – Nicht im Handel ... Autorenfreistück – Nicht im Handel 
369Transparency of Mind
30 C. Wolff: Psychologia empirica, Frankfurt, Leipzig 1738; C. Wolff: Psychologia rationalis, Frank-
furt, Leipzig 1740.
31 R. Descartes: Treatise on Man, in: The World and Other Writings, ed. S. Gaukroger, Cambridge 
1998, AT 11:202.
32 Passions, art. 35, AT 11:355 f.
33 Treatise on Man, AT 11:178 f.
34 Ibid., AT 11:185: “But the effect of the memory which seems to me to be the most worthy of 
consideration here is that, without there being any soul in this machine, it can be disposed naturally to 
imitate all the movements that real human beings, or even other similar machines, will make when the 
soul is present.”
35 On the relation between Cartesian and Aristotelian psychology see G. Hat! eld: “Psychology in 
Philosophy: Historical Perspectives”, in: S. Heinämaa, M. Reuter (eds.): Psychology and Philosophy: 
Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought, Dordrecht 2008, 1–27 and 
“Descartes’ Machine Psychology” (op. cit.). 
In order to appreciate the complexity of Descartes’ conception of the psychology of 
the human subject, we should pause to ask what we mean by “psychology”. In Des-
cartes’ time, the term “psychology”, when it was used, applied to everything covered 
in Aristotle’s De anima: the functions of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls, 
including nutritive, reproductive, sensory, motor, appetitive, and rational functions. The 
modern use of the term “psychology” was created in the eighteenth century by Chris-
tian Wolff, when he left the vegetative part to physiology and included sensory, motor, 
appetitive, and rational functions within his empirical and rational psychology.30 But 
even in the seventeenth century, as indeed in Aristotle’s own work, there was a tendency 
to focus mainly on the cognitive functions – sensory, motor, appetitive, and rational – at 
the expense of the vegetative functions.
Descartes claimed to be able to mechanize the functions of the vegetative and sensi-
tive souls.31 Beyond the vegetative functions, this meant giving a purely mechanical 
explanation of sensory, motor, and appetitive behaviors. Such would include all nonhu-
man animal behavior and all behavior in human beings that did not depend directly on 
thought. The explanatory domain is, then, by no means restricted to simple re" exes, but 
includes complex adaptive behavior such as running from a strange animal.32 It also 
includes associative learning.33 Indeed, in his Treatise on Man and Passions, Descartes 
laid out an ambitious program in physiological psychology, which he hyperbolically 
claimed was adequate to explain all human behavior.34 We know, however, that he 
exempted consciousness, reasoning, meaningful use of language, and the human will 
from this mechanistic psychology. That, however, leaves a large domain remaining for 
his machine psychology, including sensory-motor instincts, corporeal (i.  e., purely bod-
ily) imagination, memory, appetites, and passions – all of them primary functions of the 
Aristotelian sensitive soul, now mechanized. These psychological functions are carried 
out by brain mechanisms that operate independently of the mind. In human beings, 
some of these physiological operations yield mental states, including experienced im-
ages, memories, appetites, and passions. But, as in the case of the passions, the bodily 
mechanisms may already have produced adaptive behavior (as in running from the 
strange animal) before the mental experience occurs.35
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Loemker, 574–585, 575: “if this world were nothing but a composite of a ! nite number of atoms which 
move in accordance with the laws of mechanics, as the hypothesis of some thinkers holds, it is certain 
that a ! nite spirit could be so enlightened as to understand and to foresee demonstratively everything 
which would occur in a determinate time, so that this spirit not only could construct a ship capable 
of sailing by itself to a designated port, by giving it the needed route, direction, and force at the start, 
but could also form a body capable of counterfeiting a man.” The human being would be “counterfeit” 
presumably because, being wholly material, it would lack genuine perception and appetite (which are 
metaphysically grounded in soul-like monads); but it would be a complete counterfeit, i.  e., behaviorally 
equivalent to a real human being.
Interestingly, the monistic philosophers Spinoza and Leibniz each claimed an even 
larger domain for purely mechanistic processes; they each claimed that all human behav-
ior, including that which stems from reason, could be given a mechanistic explanation. 
For Spinoza, this doctrine follows from his monistically based parallelism: all thoughts 
and thought processes have their bodily counterpart.36 Leibniz’s doctrine of monads did 
not require him to adopt a full parallelism (in principle, some thoughts might not have 
counterparts in the domain of bodily phenomena), but he interpreted his doctrine of 
pre-established harmony in such a way that each thought does have a bodily counter-
part. Accordingly, he held that a completely convincing, wholly material “counterfeit” 
human being would be possible if, contrary to fact, our world were wholly material.37 
Neither Spinoza nor Leibniz intended to replace mentalistic explanation with mechani-
cal explanation, as Hobbes purported to do; but they did conclude that both sorts of 
explanation are in principle always available, even for actions governed by reason.
Beyond the shock value of the existence of early modern mechanistic psychology, the 
more salient point is that the early modern subject was a complex being. She was not 
a pure reason inhabiting a body as a kind of puppeteer. She was, in Descartes’ terms, a 
mind–body complex, in which the mind interacts with a highly intricate body that not 
only conditions sensory perceptions, but also produces the passions, stores memories in 
material format, forges associative connections unmediated by the mind, and adaptively 
responds by itself to environmental circumstances. Further, the associative connections 
in the brain, many of which are formed during infancy, seemingly can rival Freudian ex-
planation in offering causes for otherwise rationally opaque adult emotional responses, 
as witnessed by this charming passage from Descartes’ letter to Chanut of 1 February 
1647:
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38 Correspondence, AT 5:605 f.
39 Meditations, AT 7:78 ff.
40 Ibid., AT 7:82 f. Having suggested that sensory ideas do not reveal the true nature of reality (that 
being the role of the intellect), Descartes indicated the proper function of sensory perception taken by 
itself: “the proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the mind 
of what is bene! cial and harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part; and to this extent they 
are clear and distinct enough” (AT 7:83*). Of course, the intellect (or the person having the intellect) 
may use sensory perception in other pursuits, including natural philosophy, as when it uses sensory data 
to determine the refractive properties of various substances (AT 6:101 f.) or to measure the size of the 
sun (AT 7:80).
41 Passions, aa. 75, 137, AT 11:384, 430.
“Those four passions [joy, love, sadness, hatred], I believe were the ! rst we had, and 
the only ones we had before our birth. I think they were then only sensations or very 
confused thoughts, because the soul was so attached to matter that it could not yet 
do anything else except receive various impressions from it. Some years later it began 
to have other joys and other loves besides those which depend only on the body’s 
being in good condition and suitably nourished, but nevertheless the intellectual ele-
ment in its joys or loves has always been accompanied by the ! rst sensations which 
it had of them, and even the motions or natural functions which then occurred in the 
body. Before birth, love was caused only by suitable nourishment which, entering in 
abundance into the liver, heart and lungs, produced an increase of heat: this is the 
reason why similar heat still always accompanies love, even though it comes from 
other very different causes. […] But I will only say that it is because of these con-
fused sensations of our childhood, which remain joined with the rational thoughts 
by which we love what we judge worthy of love, that the nature of love is dif! cult 
for us to understand.”38
Bodily functions become associated with feelings of love in ways that explain adult 
behavior, but that are opaque to adult consciousness.
If Descartes and other early moderns are not responsible for the idea of the early 
modern subject as a transparent reason, what did they, and ! rst of all, what did he, Des-
cartes, actually do in this area? The primary grain of truth in the usual image of the Car-
tesian subject pertains to the unity of consciousness. Whereas Aristotle assigned sense 
and imagination to one faculty and reason to another, Descartes uni! ed them within 
a single mental substance and made the difference between sense and reason depend 
on the mind’s relation to the body. Sense perception is a passively caused intellectual 
representation.39 It is obscure and confused, because it doesn’t fully represent either its 
immediate cause in the brain or its distal cause: it simply represents distal causes well 
enough for the purposes of navigation.40 Similarly, whereas Aristotle assigned the pas-
sions to sensitive appetite, Descartes renders them as passively caused mental percep-
tions that confusedly represent what is good, bad, or novel in the present situation, as 
it pertains to what is good and bad for the human body.41
Why would Descartes collapse the mental aspects of all sensory, appetitive, and ra-
tional functions into the one substance of the mind? A technical reason may be found 
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42 Meditations, AT 7:81: “Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so 
on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who 
am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the 
damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken.”
43 Berkeley: An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (op. cit.), § 45. On the relation between 
sight and touch in Berkeley, see Hat! eld: Natural and Normative (op. cit.), 41 ff.; Hat! eld, Epstein: “The 
Sensory Core” (op. cit.), 363–384.
44 Leibniz: Monadology, § 57, in: Philosophical Writings, trans. Morris, Parkinson.
in S2: he excluded intentionality from material nature and he held that the phenomena 
just listed all involve representation: sensory and appetitive phenomena involve a repre-
sentational relation to the environment, while reason represents the basic properties of 
things. Beyond this technical reason, the unity of all mental phenomena in Descartes also 
allowed him to capture a basic aspect of human mental life: that all sorts of thoughts, 
from itches to seeings to dreams to metaphysical theorizing, inhabit a common arena of 
consciousness. The grain of truth to the Cartesian subject is that it does bring together, 
in a uni! ed arena of awareness, those thoughts of which we are re" ectively conscious. 
And that seems like a good thing, where by “good” I mean something that ! ts the facts, 
or ! ts our experience.
That is one Cartesian contribution. There were others. Descartes introduced a notion 
of embodiment into the modern subject, with his really distinct mind that nonetheless 
feels its body42 and has its mental experiences mysteriously determined by its body’s 
history (as in the long quotation on love, above). Berkeley, the matter-denying immate-
rialist, took the notion of embodiment further. In his theory of vision, he elaborated the 
theory that touch educates vision.43 This means that all experience of three-dimensional 
space is produced from tactile feelings of space, or feelings that arise from the activities 
of touch and the position of the body and its limbs. Vision, in Berkeley’s view, is shot 
through with tactile feeling. In seeing the tree over there, we feel the bodily motions it 
would take to walk to it. These feelings are not transparent to the mind, so that their 
source is not readily recognized. They well up from the dark recesses of prior associa-
tions, of unre" ective experience in moving and touching. (Shades of Merleau-Ponty.)
Finally, we should note a further aspect of modern subjectivity, not usually associ-
ated with the early moderns but with nineteenth-century philosophy: Leibniz’s notion 
that each subject is de! ned by a point of view. Leibniz did not invent point of view: it 
is an old notion in optics; it was understood by Descartes; it was brought to heightened 
awareness by Copernican astronomy. Leibniz added this: he de! ned individual sub-
stances by their points of view:
“just as the same town, when looked at from different sides, appears quite different 
and is, as it were, multiplied in perspective, so also it happens that because of the 
in! nite number of simple substances, it is as if there were as many different universes, 
which are however but different perspectives of a single universe in accordance with 
the different points of view of each monad.”44
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45 F. Dretske: Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
46 G. Hat! eld: “The Reality of Qualia”, in: Erkenntnis 66 (2007), 133–168, and Natural and Nor-
mative, ch. 7, sec. 2.
Individuals are not de! ned by a momentary point of view, for different individuals may 
share the same point of view at different moments. What he contributed is the idea that 
synchronically unique points of view are each but a moment in a diachronically unique 
series of perceptions. He invented the idea of the point-of-view space–time worm. Only 
for him, of course, the individual monads are not in space–time, but space–time is in 
them. Each is de! ned by its perspective, a perspective that unfolds through the sequence 
of perceptions and appetites that de! ne any individual monad.
Tallying up
I hope to have given some indication of what I mean by the complexity of the early mo-
dern subject. Now I want to take stock by comparing Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz 
with McDowell on some key issues.
First, let’s tally up their relations on selected aspects of the allegedly “Cartesian” 
subject:
      Descartes  Leibniz  Berkeley  McDowell 
S1  Consciousness as essence   no  no  no  no
S2  Intentionality extracted   yes  yes  yes  yes
S3  Veil of perception    no?  no  no  no
S4  Transparency      no  no  no  no
Because McDowell worked with a caricature, he got the real Cartesian subject wrong. 
He believed that he partially shared only S2 with the Cartesians – only partially, be-
cause he introduced “natural intentionality” via second-nature conceptual capacities –
but that he stood apart on S1, S3, and S4. Not so. Contrary to his caricature of the 
Cartesian, or early modern, subject, the essence of that subject was not consciousness, 
the adherence to a veil of perception is in question, and transparency must be rejected 
outright.
There has been some progress since the time of Descartes and Leibniz, but the prob-
lems that they raised remain open. Regarding S1, substance dualism has largely been 
abandoned in philosophical circles, but the mind–body problem has not been solved. 
Regarding S2, there are attempts to reintroduce intentionality into material nature, 
whether in the form of Dretskean “information”45, or as a natural psychological prop-
erty of sensory systems46, or through a McDowellian conceptual “second nature”. The 
topic of S3, the analysis of the perceptual relations between subject and object, remains 
unsettled, though there has of late been a ground swell of enthusiasm for naive realism. 
Finally, as regards S4, the domain of unconscious processes has been expanded in the 
past 150 years, to include not only unnoticed states that have the traditional marks of 
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47 McDowell: Mind and World (op. cit.), 55, 121.
48 Ibid., xiii–xiv, 37; Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (op. cit.), chs. 1, 3, offers a simi-
lar analysis, on which see Hat! eld: “Epistemology and Science in the Image of Modern Philosophy” 
(op. cit.). In their attacks on the “given”, McDowell and Rorty acknowledge a debt to W. Sellars: 
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in: W. Sellar: Science, Perception and Reality, London 1963, 
127–196.
49 B. Russell: “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, in: Scientia 16 (1914), 1–27; reprinted in B. 
Russell: Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays, new edn, London 1963, 108–131. Of course, Russell 
only required that we could become re" ectively aware of such constructions.
the mental, such as phenomenal character – as in Descartes’ and Leibniz’s basic per-
ceptual states – but also mental or psychological states that are assigned intentional 
content without phenomenality. So, it is true to say that the subdomain of transparent 
mental states has been comparatively reduced, through expansion of the subdomain of 
unconscious states to include mental states that lack even basic awareness.
McDowell and others mistakenly believe that they can distance themselves from the 
Cartesian subject through the issue of transparency, which is one focus of their attempts 
to critically separate themselves from modernity. The other focus is the veil of percep-
tion and indirect realism. In analyzing sensory capacities, McDowell shares with the 
Cartesians the exclusion of intentionality from (in his case, nonhuman) material nature, 
reserving it for human second nature. He does allow that material intentionality might 
be needed in psychological accounts of sensory capacities47, by contrast with his own 
epistemological account, and here he breaks from his unwitting lock-step agreement 
with Early Modern Philosophy. 
Ironically, McDowell’s denial of the epistemological relevance of nonconceptual sen-
sory intentional content may be the source of his frustrating inability to bring mind and 
world together. Like many recent epistemologists, McDowell is repulsed by sense data 
and any sort of perceptual mediation. He assimilates Descartes’ and other early mod-
ern positions to a myth of the given: sensory processes provide nonconceptual content 
that is epistemically relevant.48 His reasons for disliking such content are dif! cult to 
fathom, but they seem to follow traditional objections against sense data: that the no-
tion of “is red” is prior to “looks red”, that we don’t seem to see our own experience but 
rather seem to see objects directly, that nonconceptual content can’t serve as a basis for 
knowledge on pain of psychologism, and the like. Here, he confuses witting mediation 
– constructive processes that re" ectively take sense data as “given” working material – 
with accounts of sensory cognition that recognize mediating perceptual representations 
in the form of sensory experiences that function in guiding the subject’s navigation by 
representing the world from a point of view. 
If the mind were transparent, we might wittingly construct the world from sense 
data, along the lines once sketched by Bertrand Russell.49 But if we acknowledge that 
the senses simply present us with a world – even if by representing it from a point of 
view and in a manner that is conditioned by characteristics of the perceiving subject – 
and that they do so with nonconceptual, intentional content that in fact can show better 
or less good “! t” to the world and that is subject to various conceptualizations, then 
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50 Hat! eld: “Reality of Qualia” (op. cit.). Here I also allude to the critical direct realism of Roy Wood 
Sellars and others, which may be approached through Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-Operative Study 
of the Problem of Knowledge, ed. D. Drake, New York 1920), which contains Sellars’ paper, “Knowledge 
and Its Categories” (187–219). The critical direct realists contended that our “given” sense experience 
provides a basis for judgments using learned concepts. They af! rmed a dualism of phenomenal con-
tent and conceptual scheme, as did Wilfrid Sellars in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, esp. 
§§ 60–62.
51 For further discussion of the relation between phenomenal content and object properties and the 
(presumably learned) conceptual resources that allow us to be in referential and epistemic contact with 
material objects, see G. Hat! eld: “On Perceptual Constancy” and “Getting Objects for Free: The Phi-
losophy and Psychology of Object Perception”, in: Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy 
of Psychology, Oxford 2009, chs. 6 f.
52 Putnam: The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (op. cit.), 10. Putnam uses the maneuver 
of renaming the naïve direct realism of McDowell as “natural” realism, avowedly in order to avoid the 
conceptual web arising from the notion of “directness” so as to get back to the perceptual realism of the 
“common man”. This move assumes that the common man has a coherent theory of perception, which 
is doubtful. It also robs “natural” of its connotation of having to do with the way nature actually works.
our being in sensory contact with the world can be an epistemological starting point.50 
Perceptual representations present a world. They don’t incorrigibly “give” it to us in 
the form of sense data that we inspect; they present it, in a manner characteristic of the 
perceiving subject, under better or less good conditions of observation, with better or 
less good ! t to the world’s properties.51 We take it from there.
It is a misguided fear of representations, partly grounded in a caricatured view of the 
early modern subject, that leads McDowell, here joined by Putnam52, to posit a mystical 
sort of perceptual connection at the base of their respective naive realisms. They want 
to avoid the “given”, but they then ask us to accept that our senses somehow commune 
with objects in a “direct” (or, in Putnam’s manipulated lingo, a “natural”) manner. For 
my part, I prefer a direct realism in which causally produced, psychologically and epis-
temologically mediating representations present a distal world in a phenomenally and 
epistemically direct and immediate way, to the obscurity of McDowell’s and Putnam’s 
naive realisms. But to say more on that here would be to switch topics, from critical 
history regarding conceptions of the modern subject to the open questions that remain 
concerning how to understand the subject at all.
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